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MAJOR OPERATIONAL DECISIONS AND FREE
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: ELIMINATING THE
MANDATORY/PERMISSIVE DISTINCTION
Thirty-one years ago, in NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-War-
ner Corp.,' the United States Supreme Court ruled that all legal
collective bargaining subjects could be divided into two categories:
mandatory subjects upon which either party could insist to the point
of impasse;2 and permissive subjects about which the parties could
choose to bargain but upon which they could not insist as a condition
of agreement. 3 This decision empowered the National Labor Rela-
tions Board and the federal courts to influence the negotiating prior-
ities and substantive bargaining positions of the parties through delin-
eation of the topics upon which neither party could insist. In so
ruling, the Court disregarded the National Labor Relations Act's4
underlying premise of free collective bargaining and significantly al-
tered the collective bargaining process. In essence, Borg-Warner al-
1 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
2 "Impasse" denotes the parties' inability to conclude an agreement after good faith bargain-
ing. See Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967). The National Labor Relations
Board [hereinafter the "Board"] considers several factors in determining whether parties have
bargained to impasse; they include the length of negotiations, the parties' good faith, the
significance of unresolved issues, and the parties' view of the status of negotiations. See id. at
478. See generally i THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 634-39 (C. Morris 2d ed. 1983) (discussing
the concept of impasse in collective bargaining).
3 See Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 349. The Court reached this holding by reading together §
8(a)(5) and § 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §9 I5I-187 (1982) [hereinafter
the "Act" or "NLRA"]. See Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 348-49. Section 8(a)(5) of the Act states
that "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with
the representatives of his employees subject to the provisions of section 9(a)." 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(5). Section 8(d), in relevant part, defines collective bargaining as:
the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, ... but such obligation does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.
Id. § i58(d).
Section 8(b)(3) of the Act imposes on unions a reciprocal duty to bargain. See id. § 158(b)(3).
A third possible category of bargaining subjects are those illegal under the NLRA. See
generally i THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 2, at 863-69 (discussing illegal subjects
of bargaining such as "closed shop" agreements and "hot cargo" clauses). This Note, however,
addresses only the categorization of topics over which parties currently are allowed to bargain.
4 In 1935, Congress passed the original National Labor Relations Act, otherwise known as
the Wagner Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (i935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
i5i-x87 (1982)). In 1947, the NLRA was amended by the Labor-Management Relations (Taft-
Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 8o-ioi, 61 Stat. 136 (i947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§
141-197 (1982)). Congress again amended the NLRA in 1959 by passing the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 5,9 (1959)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 9§ 401-531 (1982)).
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lowed the administrative and judicial process to propound its own
negotiating position at the bargaining table.
The Borg-Warner holding precipitated an immediate debate among
commentators over the feasibility of this mandatory/permissive dis-
tinction.5 Congress and the Supreme Court, however, ignored the
criticism. Since then, discussion has centered on which bargaining
topics should be labeled mandatory and which permissive. 6 Nowhere
has this debate been more animated than in the area of an employer's
major operational decisions - partial plant closings, relocations, au-
tomation, subcontracting, and so forth. Because these decisions usu-
ally involve important capital expenditures by employers and often
directly affect the job security of employees, commentators have spir-
itedly advanced various tests and rules for determining whether bar-
gaining over major operational decisions should be mandatory or
permissive. 7 This Note, in contrast, contends that such line-drawing
between bargaining topics is inherently inadequate because it fails to
account for the specific needs and concerns present in an individual
bargaining relationship. Instead, the solution to the contentious dis-
pute over the categorization of major operational decisions, and more
generally to all arguments over the labeling of bargaining topics, lies
in the elimination of the mandatory/permissive distinction. Removing
the distinction would allow individual unions and employers to decide
for themselves which bargaining topics are essential to a mutually
beneficial agreement.
Part I of the Note analyzes the legislative history of the duty to
bargain. Part II then describes current law on the mandatory/per-
missive distinction. It focuses on major operational decisions because
of the extensive dispute surrounding their categorization and because
of their importance to both employees and employers. Part III then
offers specific criticisms of the mandatory/permissive distinction. It
concludes that neither recategorization nor rebalancing will redress the
problems with the current law on operational decisions. Instead, it
contends that the underlying theory of the NLRA, principles of free-
dom of contract, and sound labor policy all argue for legislative reform
5 See, e.g., Cox, Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at the October Term, 1957, 44 VA.
L. REV. 1057, 1074-86 (1958); Note, The Impact of the Borg-Warner Case on Collective Bar-
gaining, 43 MINN. L. REV. 1225 (i959); Comment, Bargaining on Nonmandatory Topics Con-
stitutes Refusal To Bargain, ii STAN. L. REV. 188 (1958).
6 See generally I THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 2, at 772-869 (reviewing case
law and selected scholarship categorizing mandatory, permissive, and illegal bargaining subjects).
7 See, e.g., George, To Bargain or Not To Bargain: A New Chapter in Work Relocation
Decisions, 69 MINN. L. REV. 667 (1985); Harper, Leveling the Road from Borg-Warner to First
National Maintenance: The Scope of Mandatory Bargaining, 68 VA. L. REV. 1447 (1982);
Hedlund, An Economic Case for Mandatory Bargaining over Partial Termination and Plant
Relocation Decisions, 95 YALE L.J. 949 (I986); Goldman, "Partial Terminations" - A Choice




eliminating the mandatory/permissive distinction. In its place, Part
IV proposes that a single, global duty of good faith should govern the
negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Congress enacted the Wagner Act in 1935 in an effort to combat
the country's industrial unrest and economic woes.8 The Act aimed
to reconstruct the labor market by remedying the existing "inequality
of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full free-
")9dom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers ....
To remedy the perceived inequalities between capital and labor, sec-
tion 7 of the Act granted employees three basic rights - the right to
organize, the right to bargain as a collective, and the right to peaceful
use of economic weapons to extract concessions from employers.' 0
Congress believed that these rights would provide unions with suffi-
cient bargaining power to negotiate acceptable terms of employment. 11
Congress did not intend, however, to preclude or inhibit free
bargaining' 2 within this reconstructed setting. As Senator Walsh,
Chairman of the Senate Education and Labor Committee, stated:
When the employees have chosen their organization, when they have
selected their representatives, all the bill proposes to do is to escort
them to the door of their employer and say, "Here they are, the legal
8 See National Labor Relations Act § i, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449, 449 (i935),
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982)) ("The denial by employers of the right of
employees to organize and the refusal by employers to accept the procedure of collective
bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest .... "); see also NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. i, 42 (1937) (noting that the right to self-organization
is "often an essential condition of industrial peace').
9 National Labor Relations Act § i, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449, 449 (i935) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § i5I (1982)); see also Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 45.
10 Section 7 of the Act provided: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection." National Labor Relations Act § 7, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49
Stat. 449, 452 (I935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (I982)).
1 See A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GoRMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 85 (ioth
ed. 1986).
12 Some would argue that the NLRA precludes true "free bargaining" because, among other
things, it requires an employer to bargain with his union. See, e.g., Epstein, A Common Law
For Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1357
(1983) ("My conclusion is that [the NLRA] is in large measure a mistake that, if possible, should
be scrapped in favor of the adoption of a sensible common law regime relying heavily upon tort
and contract law."). This Note neither disputes nor promotes this contention. Rather, it accepts
the basic § 7 rights, see supra note 1o, as given and argues for a preservation of free bargaining
within that reconstructed sphere.
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
representatives of your employees." What happens behind those doors
is not inquired into, and the bill does not seek to inquire into it. 13
While Congress did not intend to prescribe the substance or scope
of bargaining, it did intend that bargaining occur. Thus, although
the bill as originally introduced only implied a duty to bargain, 14
Congress later made that duty explicit in section 8(5). 15 Recognizing
that this duty to bargain implied a good faith effort to reach an
agreement 16 and that the enforcement of the duty could interfere with
the bargaining process, Senator Wagner clarified the scope of section8(5):
Most emphatically this provision does not imply governmental super-
vision of wage or hour agreements. It does not compel anyone to
make a compact of any kind if no terms are arrived at that are
satisfactory to him. The very essence of collective bargaining is that
either party shall be free to withdraw if its conditions are not met. 17
Thus, although the implied duty to bargain in good faith was in
tension with the Act's general refusal to supervise the bargaining
process,' 8 the legislative testimony clearly indicates that Congress did
not intend this duty to permit courts or the Board to inspect the
substantive positions of the negotiating parties.19
13 79 CONG. REC. 7648, 7660 (x935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 2373 (I935) [hereinafter 2 NLRA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY].
14 See Labor Disputes Act: Hearings on H.R. 6288 Before the House Committee on Labor,
74th Cong., ist Sess. 175 (i935) (statement of Francis Biddle, Chairman, National Labor
Relations Board), reprinted in 2 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 13, at 2649.
Is National Labor Relations Act § 8(5), Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982)). The text of § 8(a)(5) is quoted at note 3 above.
See also 79 CONG. REc. 7648, 7650 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 13, at 2348 (amending the Bill to include a duty to bargain).
16 See 79 CONG. REc. 7565, 7571 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 2 NLRA
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 13, at 2335-36 (contending that the entire union election
machinery is "rendered illusory" without a correlative duty to negotiate in good faith).
17 Id.
s See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 486 (i96o) ("Obviously there
is tension between the principle that the parties need not contract on any specific terms and a
practical enforcement of the principle that they are bound to deal with each other in a serious
attempt to resolve differences and reach a common ground."); see also Smith, The Evolution of
the "Duty To Bargain" Concept in American Law, 39 MICH. L. REv. io65, zo87-88 (1941)
(describing free bargaining and the good faith requirement as "patently inconsistent concepts').
19 Congress intended the good faith determination to be subjective and limited in scope.
See NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134-35 (ist Cir. 1953) (defining an
employer's bad faith as "a desire not to reach an agreement with the union" and concluding
that an employer is only "obliged to make some reasonable effort in some direction to compose
his differences with the union") (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (i953). This




Indeed, in 1947, because of concerns that the Board was using the
good faith analysis to inquire into the substance of various collective
bargaining agreements, 20 Congress sought to define the scope of the
duty to bargain. 2 1 Initially, the House sought to require negotiation
on only five specific categories of bargaining topics. 2 2 In amending
the bill, however, the Senate eliminated the House's detailed enumer-
ation and substituted the general language that became section 8(d),
which defines collective bargaining as negotiating in good faith "with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment." 23 Upon accepting the Senate's version, the House Conference
Report stated:
[T]he Senate amendment, while it did not prescribe a purely objective
test of what constituted collective bargaining, as did the House bill,
had to a very substantial extent the same effect as the House bill in
this regard, since it rejected, as a factor in determining good faith,
the test of making a concession and thus prevented the Board from
determining the merits of the positions of the parties.24
In context, section 8(d) should thus be seen as a response to the
Board's departure from the free bargaining principle of the Wagner
Act. Defining the scope of bargaining was intended to enhance bar-
gaining freedom rather than diminish it. However, Congress' require-
ment that parties negotiate certain minimum subjects offered a second-
best solution at odds with the broader free bargaining premises of the
Act. The solution was inadequate because its listing of "mandatory"
negotiating subjects allowed for some continued substantive interfer-
ence with free bargaining. Thus, while this Note focuses on the
problems created by Borg-Warner's misinterpretation of section 8(d)
as creating mandatory and permissive subjects, it also advocates
amendment of that portion of section 8(d) which defines mandatory
bargaining subjects.
20 The House Report contains this statement: "[T]he present Board has gone very far, in the
guise of determining whether or not employers had bargained in good faith, in setting itself up
as the judge of what concessions an employer must make and of the proposals and counterpro-
posals that he may or may not make." H.R. REP. No. 245, 8oth Cong., ist Sess. I9 (i947)
(statement of Sen. Hartley), reprinted in NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MAN-
AGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 310 (1974) [hereinafter LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
21 The House Report concluded that "unless Congress writes into the law guides for the
Board to follow, the Board may attempt to carry this process still further and seek to control
more and more the terms of collective-bargaining agreements." H.R. REP. No. 245, 8oth Cong.,
ISt Sess. 20 (1947), reprinted in LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2o, at 311.
22 See H.R. 3020, 8oth Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1947), reprinted in LMRA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 20, at 158, 166-67 (listing those subjects which the parties would be
required to discuss).
23 29 U.S.C. § i58(d) (1982).
24 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 51o, 8oth Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1947), reprinted in LMRA LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 20, at 5o5, 538.
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Section 8(d)'s departure from the Act's underlying premise, while
unfortunate, certainly did not compel the much more intrusive inter-
ference with free bargaining of the mandatory/permissive dichotomy.2 5
Indeed, the legislative pronouncements surrounding section 8(d) and
the Act's clearly expressed purpose of avoiding inquiry into the sub-
stantive positions of the negotiating parties, suggest quite the oppo-
site.26 The clear weight of the NLRA's history and its free-bargaining
ethos suggests that the mandatory/permissive distinction rests on ten-
uous legislative footing, and thus casts doubt on the current state of
the law and warrants an inspection of alternatives. Before evaluating
alternative proposals or taking up the argument for elimination of the
mandatory/permissive distinction, however, this Note reviews the state
of the law in order to give context to and highlight the need for the
Note's proposal.
II. THE STATE OF THE LAW
Borg-Warner represents the Supreme Court's seminal interpretation
of section 8(d). In Borg-Warner, the Court confronted an employer's
insistence on two contract provisions outside the scope of section 8(d)'s
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" lan-
guage.2 7 Rather than adopting an interpretation in accord with the
weight of legislative history and allowing insistence on topics not
enumerated by section 8(d),28 however, the Court interpreted the pro-
25 See infra note 28 (discussing the alternative interpretation of § 8(d) offered by Justice
Harlan in his Borg-Warner dissent).
26 Cf. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Labor Board, 350 U.S. 270, 285 (1956) (concluding that when
interpreting the NLRA the Court "'must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a
sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy'") (quoting
United States v. Boisdor6's Heirs, 49 U.S. (8 How.) iI3, 122 (185o)); id. at 293 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) ("In a word, enactments like the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Act must be
considered as an organic whole.").
27 In Borg-Warner, the employer insisted that the collective bargaining agreement include: a
"recognition" clause which recognized only the local union and excluded the international union
that the Board had certified, and a "ballot" clause that required the employees to vote on the
employer's last offer before proceeding with any strike. The Court held that these subjects fell
outside of § 8(d) and were therefore nonmandatory. See 356 U.S. at 344-50.
28 Writing in dissent, Justice Harlan advocated such an interpretation. He reasoned:
The Act sought to compel management and labor to meet and bargain in good faith as
to certain topics. This is the affirmative requirement of § 8(d) which the Board is
specifically empowered to enforce, but I see no warrant for inferring from it any power
in the Board to prohibit bargaining in good faith as to lawful matters not included in
§ 8(d).
It must not be forgotten that the Act requires bargaining, not agreement, for the
obligation to bargain ".. . does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require
the making of a concession."
356 U.S. at 357-58 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 61 Stat, 136,
142 (i947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982))) (emphasis in original). Justice
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vision expansively. It concluded that section 8(d)'s enumeration of
mandatory good faith bargaining subjects prohibited insistence on
"permissive" subjects outside its language, because such insistence was
tantamount to a refusal to bargain about the mandatory subjects
within 8(d).29 In doing so, the Court failed to offer a normative
argument for this interpretation of section 8(d);30 instead, it simply
purported to read the language of the statute to compel mandatory
and permissive categories of bargaining topics.
The results of categorizing a subject mandatory or permissive are
significant. Labeling a bargaining topic mandatory entitles either
party to a good faith discussion of that subject; further, either party
may insist to the point of impasse on the inclusion of its proposal in
the agreement. 31 In addition, an employer may not institute a uni-
lateral change in a term or condition of employment that is a man-
datory subject of bargaining unless the parties have first bargained to
impasse over the proposed change.3 2 Finally, either side may use its
Harlan's interpretation would, at least, have kept § 8(d)'s infringement of free bargaining to a
minimum. Although it would still require the parties to negotiate about each subject within §
8(d), it would not force them to make concessions on such subjects, and would also leave them
free to insist in good faith on permissive subjects.
29 See Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 349. Contesting this reasoning, Justice Harlan argued that
if a party could not insist on a permissive subject as a condition to agreement, then it could
not truly bargain over that subject at all. See id. at 353 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
30 The Court's failure to articulate an underlying rationale is strange given the clear congres-
sional purpose of avoiding substantive inspection of negotiating positions. If pressed for such a
rationale, however, the Court might have articulated three concerns. First, it could have
reiterated the Taft-Hartley Act's concern with the Board's abuse of good faith analysis. See
supra note 20. The Court's solution, however, merely substitutes formal interference for discre-
tionary interference. Cf. infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text (discussing the proper limited
scope of good faith analysis). Second, the Court might have thought that reducing the number
of bargaining subjects would reduce the number of impasse situations and thereby avoid indus-
trial strife. See Comment, supra note 5, at 192. But see Cox, supra note 5, at io82 (suggestin
that broadening the issues may sometimes actually increase the range of settlement possibilities).
Finally, the Court might have feared that without limits on bargaining subjects, the stronger
party would be able to usurp all the traditional functions of the weaker party. In fact, employers
had expressed this concern. See Comment, supra note 5, at 192-93 (noting management's
concern that unions might interfere with its traditional prerogatives) (citing CHAMBERLAIN, THE
UNION CHALLENGE TO MANAGEMENT CONTROL 129-42 (1948)). This concern, however, goes
to bargaining power, not bargaining subjects. See infra pp. 1989-9o.
31 See Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 349; see also 29 U.S.C. § i58(d) (1982).
32 See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). In Katz, the employer unilaterally implemented
a new sick-leave plan, a substantial wage increase over what had been offered during negotia-
tions, and merit increases. See id. at 741. The Court held that such unilateral changes in
mandatory subjects amounted to a per se refusal to bargain in good faith. See id. at 747.
The Katz holding has not been applied to unions because of their relative inability to affect
the terms and conditions of employment. See i THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 2,
at 564-65. But see Associated Home Builders v. NLRB, 352 F.2d 745, 750 (9th Cir. i965)
(holding that a union's unilateral imposition of production quotas, enforced by fines, could
constitute a refusal to bargain about a mandatory subject).
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economic weapons - a strike or lockout, for example - to encourage
concession on a mandatory topic. 33
Different results flow from denominating a subject permissive.
First, neither party may insist on the inclusion of that subject in the
agreement.34 Although either party may seek discussion of a permis-
sive topic, refusal by the other does not violate sections 8(a)(5) or
8(b)(3). 35  Thus, the use of economic weapons to secure concession on
a permissive subject constitutes an unfair labor practice. Second, both
employers and unions may make unilateral changes in permissive
bargaining subjects without consulting the other party.3 6
The methodology for categorizing major operational decisions was
originally articulated by Justice Stewart in his concurrence in Fibre-
board Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB. 37 Attempting to discern which
33 In this context, the question that arises is whether a union or employer must bargain to
impasse before using its economic weapons. In NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361
U.S. 477 (ig6o), during the course of negotiating a collective agreement, union members, among
other tactics, refused to solicit new business and held half-day walkouts as part of a general
work slowdown designed to exert pressure on the employer. See id. at 48o. The Supreme
Court held that this activity did not necessitate a finding of bad faith.
While the Insurance Agents' holding would seem to apply to employers as well as unions,
Katz's subsequent preclusion of employer unilateral action prior to impasse suggests otherwise.
See supra note 32. Thus, an employer may not make unilateral changes during negotiations in
an effort to encourage concession. Although facially inequitable, the relative inability of unions
to effect unilateral changes in basic terms of employment justifies this result. See supra note
32.
An employer's use of a lockout, however, raises a different issue. Although a lockout is a
"unilateral change," unions have a reciprocal ability to strike or slowdown under Insurance
Agents'. Thus, the Board upheld the use of a pre-impasse lockout in Darling & Co., x71
N.L.R.B. 8oi (1968), aff'd sub nom. Lane v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 12o8 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
34 See Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 349.
35 See id. (stating that as to permissive matters, "each party is free to bargain or not to
bargain, and to agree or not to agree").
36 See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers Local i v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157,
187-88 (i971). The ability to take unilateral action on permissive subjects is of great importance
in the major operational decision context because most such decisions occur as unilateral changes.
See infra pp. Ig8o-8I.
3' 379 U.S. 203 (1964). Fibreboard constituted the Supreme Court's first prominent statement
on the scope of bargaining required of an employer seeking to make an operational change.
The Court held that an employer's decision to subcontract a portion of its work performed by
bargaining unit employees constituted a mandatory subject of bargaining. While limiting its
holding to the type of subcontracting present in the case, see id. at 215, it hinted that every
managerial decision that terminates employment may be a mandatory bargaining subject. See
id. at 210 ("The words ['terms and conditions of employment' used in § 8(d)] plainly cover
termination of employment.").
Worried about the "disturbing breadth" of the majority's holding, see id. at 218 (Stewart,
J., concurring), Justice Stewart crafted his concurrence to curtail the holding's scope by delin-
eating categories within which an employer had complete discretion to act. See id. at 222-23.
This concurrence subsequently became the most influential part of the Fibreboard decision. See,




type of managerial decisions affecting job security fell within 8(d)'s
"terms and conditions of employment" language, Justice Stewart dis-
tinguished three different types of bargaining topic's. 38 The first cat-
egory consists of those subjects directly involving "conditions of em-
ployment" so as to lie securely within the parameters of section 8(d).
Such mandatory subjects include seniority rights, freedom from dis-
criminatory discharge, and mandatory retirement. Second are those
decisions that have so indirect an effect on job security that they
cannot be considered conditions of employment. Decisions about ad-
vertising, marketing, financing, product design, and so forth fall
within this "permissive" category. Third, Justice Stewart enumerated
a group of decisions that could imperil job security but that also
concern significant capital investment or the scope of an enterprise.
He concluded that within this category, those decisions "which lie at
the core of entrepreneurial control"39 ought not be subject to a man-
datory bargaining requirement. Justice Stewart, however, did not
define which subjects affecting job security fell within this area of
"entrepreneurial control." Thus, his concurring opinion left unre-
solved the question of which major operational decisions constituted
permissive subjects of bargaining.
The Supreme Court did not speak directly on this issue until its
1981 decision in First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB. 40 Con-
fronted with an employer's decision to terminate one of its opera-
tions, 41 the Court used Justice Stewart's tripartite analysis42 and
adopted a balancing test to determine which subjects within Stewart's
third category constitute decisions that lie "at the core of entrepreneur-
ial control" and are therefore permissive. The Court stated that
bargaining over decisions that have an impact on continued employ-
ment should be required "only if the benefit, for labor-management
relations and the collective-bargaining process, outweighs the burden
placed on the conduct of the business. 43 Applying this balancing test
to partial closings in general, the Court articulated a per se rule44 that
38 See 379 U.S. at 222-23 (Stewart, J., concurring).
39 Id. at 223.
40 452 U.S. 666 (i98i).
41 See id. at 668-70. In First National Maintenance, an employer, engaged in a maintenance
business, terminated a contract with a nursing home in response to a dispute over a management
fee and discharged the employees who had worked there. See id. at 669.
42 See id. at 676-77.
43 Id. at 679. Commentators have been sharply critical of the Court's balancing test for
failing to account for the burden on labor as well as that on the employer. See, e.g., The
Supreme Court, 198o Term - Leading Cases, 95 HARV. L. REV. 93, 332-34 (1981) [hereinafter
The Supreme Court, rg8o Term].
44 Numerous commentators have concluded that the Court's generalized discussion created
a per se rule for all partial closing situations. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, z98o Term, supra
note 43, at 334 ("[Tlhe Court constructed a per se rule by calculating burdens and benefits
1989] 1979
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the employer's need for unfettered discretion to close down a portion
of his business for economic reasons outweighs any benefit that might
accrue from union participation in that decision. 45 The Court, how-
ever, expressly declined to apply its balancing calculus to other deci-
sions involving operational change. 46
Four years later, acting pursuant to its rulemaking authority, 47 the
Board completed the task left open by First National Maintenance.
In Otis Elevator Co. [Otis Elevator II],48 it ruled that bargaining over
any topic within Justice Stewart's third category of management de-
cisions is not required unless that decision "turns upon a reduction of
labor costs." '49 The current framework thus not only makes an em-
ployer's partial closing decision per se permissive, but also makes
permissive all other major operational decisions not motivated solely
by labor costs. 50
Decisions that turn solely on labor costs will be rare. Management
typically justifies and usually bases major decisions on a variety of
grounds in order to emphasize their necessity. 5 1 Thus, under current
law, almost all major operational decisions are permissive subjects
and unions are precluded from insisting on bargaining about such
decisions.5 2 Compounding the problem for unions, the operational
change will not necessarily coincide with the negotiation of the collec-
across widely divergent industries and collective bargaining configurations.'); Note, Labor Law
- A Balancing of Interests Test Applied to the Duty To Bargain About a Partial Closing
Decision: First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 6I N.C.L. REv. 365, 365-66 (1983).
45 See 452 U.S. at 686.
46 See id. at 686 n.22.
47 See 29 U.S.C. § i56 (1982). Section 6 of the Act states that "the Board shall have
authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind ... such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act." Id.
48 269 N.L.R.B. 89r (1984). The Board held that an employer's decision to relocate its
research and development operation to a more modern facility was not a mandatory bargaining
topic even though labor costs "may have been one of the circumstances which stimulated the
evaluation process which generated the decision." Id. at 892.
49 Id. at 893.
s The Board's "turns on labor costs" standard was recently endorsed by the Fifth Circuit.
See Local 2179, United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 822 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1987). But cf. Arrow
Automotive Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 853 F.2d 223, 228 (4 th Cir. 1988) (rejecting the Board's
"turns on labor costs standard" and applying the per se rule of First National Maintenance).
51 See George, supra note 7, at 692. Indeed, the "turns on labor costs" test does not provide
a union mu-ch more protection from the effects of unnegotiated major changes than that already
available under the Supreme Court's decision in Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co.,
380 U.S. 263 (I965). In Darlington, the Court held that although an employer has an absolute
right to terminate his entire business for any reason he pleases, such a right does not extend to
a partial closing motivated by anti-union animus. See id. at 274-75. Thus, under Darlington
an employer may not relocate because he does not like the union, and under Otis Elevator 11,
an employer may not relocate because he does not like the cost of the union. Any additional
measure of protection for the union must indeed be slight.




rive bargaining agreement. Unforeseen economic exigencies often re-
quire management to decide quickly whether to relocate or close a
portion of a business. Thus, major operational decisions often arise
as "unilateral changes" that an employer may make with impunity
given the decisions' current classification as permissive subjects. The
timing of such major operational decisions places unions in a double
bind. A union may neither covertly insist on bargaining as part of a
broader initial agreement that includes bargainable mandatory sub-
jects,5 3 nor may it exert economic pressure at the time of the change
because the decision is deemed "permissive."
III. A CRITIQUE OF THE MANDATORY/PERMISSIVE DISTINCTION
The vigorous debate over the labeling of major operational deci-
sions as mandatory or permissive topics arises from strong interests
on both sides. From the employees' perspective, categorizing an op-
erational decision as permissive produces a harsh outcome. Because
such decisions usually result in temporary or permanent job loss, they
affect employment in a more significant way than any adjustment of
wages and hours; yet, employees may not insist on protection from
such an action. Employers, however, may view such a categorization
as appropriate. They can argue that major operational decisions go
to the very heart of managerial prerogatives and that management
has "great need for speed, flexibility, and secrecy in meeting business
opportunities and exigencies."5 4 Further, employers might contend
that they have every incentive to confer with the union if labor costs
are truly a factor in deciding on an operational change.5 5
Certainly, more sophisticated arguments can be marshalled to sup-
port either the employees' or employers' perspective.5 6 However, re-
gardless of their sophistication or motivation, such arguments are
inherently inadequate. They fail because they amount only to the
best guess or most well-intentioned wish of courts or commentators
53 See infra p. 1984. A union, of course, can bargain in the initial agreement over the
eventuality of a major operational change. However, the employer's lack of incentive to bargain
over permissive subjects greatly diminishes the union's chances of success.
S4 First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 682-83. Employers, and apparently a majority of
the Supreme Court, worry that categorizing major operational decisions as mandatory will
simply provide unions with a "powerful tool for achieving delay" without creating any new hope
for a feasible solution. Id. at 683; see also Loomis & Herman, Management's Reserved Rights
and the NLRB - An Employer's View, ig LAB. L.J. 695 (1968).
SS See First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 682.
56 See, e.g., George, supra note 7 (developing a methodology for applying the First National
Maintenance balancing test); Goldman, supra note 7, at io89 (2967) (arguing that employer
decisions involving fixed capital should not require bargaining); Hedlund, supra note 7, at 950,
961-68 (arguing that a bargaining requirement for operational decisions would "enhance eco-
nomic efficiency by promoting mutually beneficial exchange").
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as to which bargaining topics employers and unions value most. In-
stead, these questions should be resolved by the parties themselves.
Rather than criticizing the current categorization of bargaining
subjects, therefore, this Part critiques the mandatory/permissive dis-
tinction itself and argues for its elimination. The mandatory/permis-
sive dichotomy's primary problem is that it distorts the bargaining
process by allowing the Board and the courts to determine the scope
of bargaining. In addition, its application diminishes creativity in
bargaining relationships and encourages subterfuge in the negotiating
process.
Allowing the Board and the courts to determine the scope of
bargaining has a number of disadvantages. First, compared to the
negotiating parties, the Board and the courts are ill-equipped to decide
which subjects are necessary components of a collective bargaining
agreement. Composed entirely of attorneys,5 7 the Board's knowledge
of industrial relations in general is inevitably incomplete; this short-
coming is only magnified when it deals with the peculiar needs of
each workplace environment.58 Furthermore, the judges who review
the decisions of the Board usually have even less experience in indus-
trial relations.5 9
Second, leaving the determination of the scope of bargaining to
the Board and the courts leaves the bargaining position of the parties
to the vicissitudes of the electoral and appointment process rather
than to the parties' respective bargaining strengths. The "proper"
scope of bargaining fluctuates as the composition of the Board60 or
the Court changes. 61 Although changing judicial and administrative
standards are not necessarily problematic, they are detrimental in this
context. Achieving the most mutually beneficial bargaining agreement
is far more likely when bargaining reflects the particular needs of
57 See Letter from National Labor Relations Board to author (April 23, 1989) (enclosing
copies of the current Board members' curricula vitae).
58 See Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union
Representation, 98 HARV. L. REv. 351, 378-79 (1985). Comparing judicial settlement to private
arbitration, Professor Weiler states that "it would be difficult to choose an institution worse
suited to grappling with difficult issues of work rules and employment conditions than a
government agency like the NLRB." Id. at 379 (citation omitted).
59 Id. at 378. The Court's decision in First National Maintenance is particularly troubling
in this regard. A balancing test that weighs an employer's need for entrepreneurial discretion
against the benefits of the bargaining process merely replicates in the abstract the specific
decision-making process of an employer familiar with his own particular industry.
60 The National Labor Relations Board consists of five members, appointed to staggered
five-year terms by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. See 29 U.S.C. §
153(a) (1982).
61 The change in the law between Fibreboard and First National Maintenance, coinciding
with a change in the composition of the Court, exemplifies this phenomenon.
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employers and employees within individual industries rather than po-
litical adjustments in the administrative and judicial process. 62
Third, and most importantly, categorizing bargaining subjects di-
minishes the parties' autonomy to bargain over those subjects that
they deem most important. This effect not only promotes inefficient
bargaining, but also conflicts with free contract and the premises
underlying the NLRA. As discussed in Part I, the NLRA provided
for free bargaining by reconstructing the labor market. It allowed
employees to organize themselves 6 3 and then provided for free con-
tracting between an employer and his employees as a group. 64 It
entitled both sides to negotiate in good faith for those concessions that
their collective bargaining power 65 could provide.
By diminishing the autonomy of the parties, the mandatory/per-
missive distinction tends to stifle creativity in bargaining relation-
ships. 66 When the Board or the Court determines whether a particular
subject is mandatory or permissive, it freezes the allocation of respon-
sibility between union and employer. 6 7 Furthermore, when it sets the
62 Indeed, political adjustment was not the result intended by the Wagner Act. In Order of
R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342 (I944), the Supreme Court
stated: "Collective bargaining was not defined by the statute which provided for it, but it
generally has been considered to absorb and give statutory approval to the philosophy of
bargaining as worked out in the labor movement in the United States." Id. at 346. This
command becomes somewhat circular when read in conjunction with § 8(d)'s delineation of
required subjects of bargaining and Borg-Warner's expansion of the definitional analysis. If
courts look to industry practice to determine the proper scope of bargaining, they may simply
inspect practices mandated by previous decisions.
63 Under § 8(a)(2) of the Act, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to dominate or
interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization." 29 U.S.C. § I58(a)(2)
(1982).
64 Section 9(a) requires employers to bargain with the union and makes a union chosen by
a majority of employees the exclusive representative of all employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)
(1982).
6s Aside from its members' skills and demand for those skills in the workplace, a union's
bargaining power is a function of "three basic elements: the right to strike, the ability to strike
successfully, and the amount of loss which can be inflicted on the employer." Dubin & Gooch,
Unilateral Action as a Legitimate Economic Weapon: Power Bargaining by the Employer upon
Expiration of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 666, 693 (1962) (noting
the "three basic elements"). An employer's bargaining power will generally depend on his ability
to withstand a work stoppage, whether a strike or a lockout.
66 Several commentators have argued that the mandatory/permissive distinction limits cre-
ativity. See, e.g., Schlossberg & Fetter, U.S. Labor Law and the Future of Labor-Management
Cooperation, 37 LAB. L.J. 595, 61o-ii (1986); Sockell, "Reflections on Borg-Warner": Appli-
cation of the Mandatory-Permissive Dichotomy to the Duty To Bargain and Unilateral Action:
A Review and Reevaluation, i WM. & MARY L. REV. 918, 937-38 (1974).
67 Advocates of the current regime might argue that the opportunity to seek bargaining over
permissive subjects sufficiently promotes creativity. However, because one party can simply
refuse to discuss any permissive topics, both parties may well remain uninformed about the
possible value of different proposals.
19891 1983
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
standard for one industry, it sets the standard for all industries, and
thus inhibits individual employers and unions from negotiating the
most mutually beneficial collective bargaining agreement. Such an
agreement is much more likely to be obtained when bargaining deci-
sions depend on the particular workplace needs and economic envi-
ronment within an industry. For example, employees working in an
area of the country with low unemployment and in an industry that
requires easily transferable skills may not need to bargain for a pro-
vision prohibiting relocation. On the other hand, employees in an
industry with high unemployment and limited mobility may feel that
such a provision is essential. Unions and employers need freedom to
find solutions amenable to their particular workplaces.
The current mandatory/permissive framework, furthermore, en-
courages subterfuge in the bargaining relationship. Unable to insist
on a permissive subject legally, negotiators may attempt to force
bargaining on non-mandatory topics sub silentio. 68 For example, a
union negotiator could propose an unreasonably large wage increase
in conjunction with a contractual provision prohibiting relocation.
Then, while insisting that the relocation provision is not a precondition
of agreement, the negotiator could carefully 69 hint that the union will
insist on the wage increase to impasse so that it may use its economic
weapons, unless the employer relents on the relocation provision.
Thus subterfuge inhibits efficient bargaining. Because the parties
must always avoid the appearance of insisting on a permissive subject,
they may be unable to address forcefully the precise issues hindering
agreement. 70
The treatment of most operational decisions as permissive subjects
augments the potential for subterfuge. As the importance of a partic-
ular topic increases, negotiators are increasingly tempted to force their
adversaries to bargain over that topic. Given the importance to em-
ployees of fundamental operational decisions, then, the incentive for
subterfuge is great.
Despite its problems, the use of subterfuge often allows parties to
insist on permissive topics and thus it creates a de facto bargaining
65 See Cox, supra note 5, at 1076-77 (discussing different tactics that a negotiator may
employ in order to bargain on permissive subjects).
69 A negotiator would need to be "careful" because in a future unfair labor practice proceed-
ing, the employer could use his statements as evidence to show that the union had in fact
insisted on the permissive provision. See, e.g., Good GMC, Inc., 267 N.L.R.B. 583, 586-88
(1982) (opinion of administrative law judge concluding that "[c]onsideration of all surrounding
circumstances indicates that [the employer] in effect insisted that the Union enter into a settle-
ment [on a permissive subject] ... before it would sign the contract').
70 See Cox, supra note 5, at 1077. Professor Cox also suggests that subterfuge may lead to
an inefficient use of economic weapons and provides an interesting example: "During the years
in which the Massachusetts court held it unlawful to strike for a union shop, there were not
many strikes upon that issue but a very considerable number of strikes for higher wages were
settled as soon as the employer decided to grant a union shop agreement." Id. at 1077 n.64.
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regime that permits insistence on permissive subjects. This de facto
bargaining process, however, lacks persuasive force as an argument
for maintaining the current legal regime. Surely, the current law
should not be maintained simply because it is ineffective. Indeed, if
such de facto bargaining is truly widespread, 71 then eliminating the
mandatory/permissive dichotomy would not significantly upset the ex-
pectations of the parties. Moreover, any failure of the current law to
reflect the bargaining practices of employers and unions can only serve
to delegitimize the Act as a whole.72
More importantly, the de facto ability to insist on bargaining is
not complete. Neither party may use subterfuge when a mid-term
unilateral change is made. Thus, in cases of major operational deci-
sions, sub silentio insistence on bargaining often is not an option for
a union.7 3 Furthermore, the current regime denies those negotiators
who are not clever enough to engage in subterfuge the same oppor-
tunities for bargaining. Likewise, negotiators should not be penalized
for complying with the law for its own sake.
The foregoing critique suggests that the mandatory/permissive dis-
tinction is severely flawed in both concept and application and that
71 Opportunity to bargain over major operational changes, despite their permissive status,
does appear to be wide-ranging. For example, an employer has a duty to bargain over the
effects of a planned operational change. See First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 681; see also
NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d ix, i96 (3d Cir. 1965). Because this duty
attaches prior to implementation of the change, see Soule Glass & Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652
F.2d 1O55, lo85-86 (1st Cir. ig8i), in many instances the duty to bargain about effects will be
virtually identical to any duty to bargain over the operational decision itself. See Kohler,
Distinctions Without Differences: Effects Bargaining in Light of First National Maintenance, 5
INDUS. REL. L.J. 402 (1983) (arguing that the duties are coextensive).
The Board's decision in Good GMC, Inc., 267 N.L.R.B. 583 (1982) further enhances the
ability to insist on permissive subjects. In Good GMC, a union signed an agreement accepting
all of management's proposals except one permissive subject. See id. Management refused to
agree without inclusion of the permissive subject and withdrew the entire contract. See id. at
583-84. Rejecting the administrative law judge's determination that this action amounted to
insistence on a permissive subject, the Board held that an employer must be allowed to
restructure the entire package in such situations. See id; see also Nordstrom, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B.
6oi (1977) (holding that one party cannot effectively close negotiations by simply agreeing to
only the mandatory requests of the other party).
Finally, further de facto bargaining will occur because of the new plant closing law. Its
requirement that an employer provide 6o days notice of plant closings and mass lay-offs will
provide unions with significant time to demand bargaining over the effects of such changes.
See Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act § 3(a), Pub. L. No. 100-379, 202 Stat.
890, 891-92 (2988) [hereinafter Plant Closing Law]. For a more detailed discussion of the plant
closing law's effect on the workplace, see PLANT CLOSINGS: THE COMPLETE RESOURCE GUIDE
(BNA Special Report 1988).
72 In fact, the NLRA was specifically designed to take account of industrial bargaining
practice in determining good faith. See supra note 62. It was created not to constrain the
collective bargaining process but to "encourage" it. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
73 A union, of course, could use subterfuge during the negotiation of the initial agreement
to force bargaining on contingent operational changes.
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change is warranted. Indeed, reform may be more compelling and
acceptable now than when Borg-Warner was decided over thirty years
ago. The Supreme Court's holding in First National Maintenance
and the Board's subsequent broadening, under the Otis Elevator II
standard, of those subjects within an employer's entrepreneurial con-
trol have focused and energized debate on the adverse consequences
of the mandatory/permissive distinction. The categorization of major
operational decisions highlights the inadequacies of the dichotomy
because the stakes of that categorization are so high. In addition,
thirty years and various changes in the personnel and philosophies of
the Board and the Supreme Court, have taught both employers and
unions of the potential dangers of the mandatory/permissive dichot-
omy. Whereas in Borg-Warner and Fibreboard unions were winners
in the categorization struggle, of late they have been on the losing
end of battles over the scope of bargaining. Although this pattern
would appear to suggest that presently only unions would support
change, that is not necessarily the case. Provident employers should
recognize that a differently constituted Board or Court could decide
to recategorize currently permissive subjects.
IV. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS
Three alternative bargaining regimes could replace the current
mandatory/permissive dichotomy. First, the law could require good
faith bargaining as to each proposal advanced by management or
union. Second, following Justice Harlan's dissent in Borg-Warner,74
the Court could reinterpret section 8(d) to require good faith discussion
of each subject within the language of 8(d) and to allow insistence on
subjects outside 8(d)'s terms. Third, as this Note advocates, the law
could simply require overall good faith bargaining.
The first proposal would eliminate the mandatory/permissive dis-
tinction by, in effect, making all subjects mandatory.75 It would
require each party to discuss in good faith any issue that the other
chose to present. A party would be required to use its bargaining
power only to gain a concession. Likewise, in the midterm unilateral
change context, an employer would be required to bargain with the
union over any change the union desired to discuss.
74 See supra note 28 (discussing Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion).
75 Professor Archibald Cox advanced this approach soon after Borg-Warner. See Cox, supra
note 5, at io86. He suggested that the Court should broadly interpret the "terms or conditions
of employment" language of § 8(d) so as to include every subject which management or labor
might advance that was "not inconsistent with a federal statute or declared public policy." Id.;
see also H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 68-82 (1968) (advocating a similar
interpretation of § 8(d)).
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The second proposal would guarantee each party good faith dis-
cussion of all subjects within the terms of section 8(d), and on those
subjects would require each to use its bargaining power only to gain
concessions. Each could also use its bargaining power to obtain both
discussion and concession on any topic outside the terms of 8(d).
Thus, both parties could insist to impasse on any subject. In the
midterm unilateral change context, a union could obtain good faith
discussion of all 8(d) subjects.
Both the first and second proposals would be an improvement over
the current regime. By allowing employers and employees to press
for any issue that they deem important, the proposals would encourage
creativity and avoid the problems of subterfuge. Both options, how-
ever, have flaws. The first proposal would likely prove time-consum-
ing and costly. The ability to force good faith negotiation on any
subject would give both parties an incentive to put forward proposals
on numerous topics in the hope that discussion might lead to compro-
mise or concession on each issue. Although the proposing party will
have countervailing incentives to conserve its own time and to avoid
concession elsewhere in the agreement, these countervailing concerns
will have less influence in the context of midterm unilateral action.
Because bargaining on a midterm change would not require any
concession in the existing collective bargaining agreement, 76 a party
has an incentive to demand bargaining on a midterm change whenever
delay would be beneficial. Thus, a union might well bargain over a
managerial decision which it would have readily conceded to the
employer's discretion during the negotiation of the initial agreement.
A more significant problem with both regimes is that they conflict
with free contract norms and the broader premises of the NLRA.
Although certainly to a lesser degree than the current regime, both
proposals would diminish the autonomy of the negotiating parties.
The first proposal requires both sides to discuss each subject advanced
by the other party. Thus, even if a party bargained in complete good
faith, it could not refuse to discuss a particular topic. Similarly, the
second proposal requires discussion of particular subjects - those
within section 8(d). Not only does this diminish bargaining autonomy,
but it has the added disadvantage of requiring continued judicial and
administrative delineation of subjects that fall within 8(d).
These proposals might retain one attraction: by implementing them
as an administrative or judicial matter, reformers could avoid the risk
of a negative legislative outcome. The Court either could read 8(d)'s
"terms and conditions of employment" language so expansively as to
make all subjects mandatory, 77 or it could simply return to Justice
76 A union might choose, however, to make concessions in the existing agreement.
77 See supra note 75 (discussing such an alternative).
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Harlan's Borg-Warner dissent. Judicial reform, however, would
wreak havoc on the principle of stare decisis. The removal of the
vast accretion of law built upon Borg-Warner goes beyond the role of
the judiciary.78 More importantly, judicial reform would leave in
place section 8(d)'s misconceived delineation of required subjects of
collective bargaining. Although judicial reform within the framework
of 8(d) is possible, it would be an insufficient affirmation of free
collective bargaining and the broader theory of the NLRA.
Rather than requiring union and employer to bargain in good faith
over every issue advanced by the opposing party, the NLRA, specif-
ically section 8(d), should be amended to make explicit one of its
underlying premises: unions and employers should be required to
bargain in good faith - nothing more and nothing less. Each party
should be allowed to insist on discussion of or to refuse to discuss any
subject 79 as long as that party bargains more generally in good faith
toward the attainment of a collective bargaining agreement.80 Under
this scheme, each side would allocate its bargaining power to those
issues that it counted most important. Thus, for example, a union
could insist on a contractual provision prohibiting relocation and en-
courage discussion and concession by taking tough positions on other
issues or exerting economic pressure. Likewise, an employer could
insist on discretion over relocation decisions.
This proposal might appear to make all subjects permissive, but
it does not. Current law forbids a party to insist on a permissive
subject to the point of impasse and to use its economic weapons to
encourage concession on that subject. The proposed regime, however,
leaves a party free to insist on any subject to impasse and to use its
economic weapons to encourage concession.
The good faith standard envisioned under the proposal is a sub-
jective test of whether a party is willing to reach an agreement.81
Although the scope of this Note precludes a detailed analysis of good
78 The Court has generally been unwilling to reverse itself from longstanding statutory
constructions. See, e.g., llinois Brick Co. v. fllinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977) ("[W]e must
bear in mind that considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory construc-
tion, where Congress is free to change this Court's interpretation of its legislation.').
79 Neither party, of course, could discuss or agree to contract proposals illegal under the
NLRA. See Meat Cutters Local 421 (Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co.), 81 N.L.R.B. 1052, io6o-61
(I949); cf. Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
80 Writing in ig5o, Professors Cox and Dunlop advanced the view that the NLRA was not
intended to limit or define the scope of bargaining. See Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective
Bargaining by the National Labor Relations Board, 63 HARV. L. REv. 389, 389-97 (1950),
They decided, however, that the enactment of § 8(d) and prior judicial interpretation of § 8(a)(5)
bound them to "assume for all practical purposes that an employer ... must 'bargain collectively'
in some sense of the term about each and every subject embraced by section 9(a)." Id. at 400-
oi. The article then addressed interpretations of § 8(d) that would minimize government
intervention in the bargaining process. See id. at 401-32.
81 See supra note I9 (discussing the meaning of good faith).
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faith8 2 and the remedies for its violation,8 3 it is essential that the good
faith inquiry be limited84 and that it not look to the bargaining
positions of the parties; otherwise, that inquiry may provide a means
for continued interference with the substantive scope of bargaining.85
Good faith does not mean "good deal." In the end, a party's success
in the negotiation process must be determined by its possession and
use of bargaining power.
This emphasis on bargaining power will likely cause the greatest
concern to critics of the proposal. If employers and unions can use
their bargaining power to force negotiation and concession on cur-
rently permissive topics, then strong employers and strong unions may
be able to gain concessions in areas formerly reserved to the other
party. Thus, a strong employer could insist upon contract provisions
dealing with internal union matters, and a strong union could co-opt
the traditional prerogatives of management such as marketing, prod-
uct design, and capital expenditures. Although employers, in general,
may have more to fear from the proposal because they currently have
82 For more detailed expositions of the scope and meaning of good faith, see Gross, Cuilen
& Hanslowe, Good Faith in Labor Negotiations: Tests and Remedies, 53 CORNELL L. REv.
io09 (1968); and Cox, The Duty To Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARv. L. REV. 1401 (1958).
8 Under current law, the usual remedy for refusing to bargain in good faith is merely an
order to return to the table and start bargaining in good faith. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB,
397 U.S. 99, io8 & n.5 (970) (refusing to grant a remedy ordering an employer to agree to a
specific term in an agreement); cf. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 610-15 (1969)
(discussing the Board's power to issue a so-called "bargaining order").
The good faith inquiry may have more significance in the context of a strike. Under the
present regime, if a union engages in an economic strike, the employer may hire permanent
replacements. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). If, however, the
Board finds that the strike is in response to an employer's unfair labor practice - a refusal to
bargain in good faith, for example - it may order reinstatement of the striking employees even
if that reinstatement displaces the replacement workers. See In re Brown Shoe Co., i N.L.R.B.
803 (936).
84 See, e.g., White v. NLRB, 255 F.2d 564 (Sth Cir. 1958) (upholding an employer's insistence
on a broad management functions clause). In White, the court suggested that the good faith
bargaining obligation was satisfied as long as the employer was "willing to reduce [some agree-
ment] to writing and sign it." Id. at 566.
85 Although the good faith bargaining obligation necessarily limits free contract in the sense
that a party cannot choose not to contract, see supra note 18 and accompanying text, the
interference should not go beyond the basic requirement that a party be willing to reach some
agreement. See supra note 84.
Still, critics of the proposal might argue that any good faith inquiry will allow the Board to
return to its pre-Taft-Hartley practice of invading the substance of agreements through the
interpretation of good faith. See supra note 2o. Even setting aside this Note's emphasis on a
limited inquiry, § 8(d)'s explicit statement that good faith bargaining "does not compel either
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession," 29 U.S.C. § I58(d) (1982),
decreases this possibility. See also H.K. Porter, 397 U.S. 99. As a practical matter, because a
"bargaining order" or reinstatement is the usual remedy, see supra note 83, even a stringent




more areas within their discretion, they also will generally have greater
bargaining power with which to protect their interests.8 6 Thus, free
bargaining will not systematically advantage or disadvantage either
party. Furthermore, while the concern over bargaining power has
validity, it is not a fear that supports either legislative or judicial
intervention to determine the scope of bargaining. Rather than simply
limiting the subjects over which unequal bargaining occurs and suf-
fering the attendant decrease in creativity and autonomy, a better
solution, if necessary, would be to reallocate bargaining weapons.8 7
Such reform would accord with the NLRA's design of providing the
parties with sufficient bargaining power, and then allowing them to
use that power as they see fit.
An overall obligation to bargain in good faith would succeed where
the mandatory/permissive distinction fails and would constitute sound
labor policy. First, it would encourage the development of creative
collective bargaining agreements by allowing employers and employees
to bargain over new workplace roles and responsibilities with reference
to their particular skills and desires.88 In order for American industry
to succeed in increasingly competitive world markets, the law should
facilitate new divisions of responsibility between employer and union
that take advantage of the peculiar goals and challenges facing each
industry.
Second, an overall obligation to bargain in good faith would elim-
inate the incentive to engage in subterfuge.8 9 Neither side would need
to make unacceptable proposals of a "mandatory" topic simply to
retain the ability to use its economic weapons when it could not obtain
86 See Weiler, supra note 58 at 385-404 (arguing that the current allocation of economic
weapons skews bargaining power in favor of employers). While unions are not by any means
universally weak, the declining percentage of unions in the American workforce, see id. at 351
& n.2 (noting that the "unionized share of the workforce [was in 1984] about half of what it
was just a quarter of a century ago"), suggests that they frequently have less bargaining power
than employers.
87 For a thorough discussion of the current allocation of bargaining weapons, see Weiler,
cited above in note 58, at 405. See also id. at 412-I9 (advocating reforms such as the
elimination of permanent replacements for strikers and limited use of secondary boycotts for
non-organizational purposes).
88 An overall good faith regime would facilitate joint labor-management efforts. It might,
for example, increase the prevalence of agreements such as the one undertaken by the UAW
and the GM-Toyota joint venture at New United Motors Manufacturing, Inc. in Fremont,
California. See generally Schlossberg & Fetter, supra note 66, at 596-97. In their collective
bargaining agreement, management and union agreed to share the "risk, responsibility, and
reward of partnership." Id. at 596 (emphasis in original) (quoting Letter from Bruce Lee, Region
6 Director, UAW, to the Members of Local 2244 (June 1985)). Prior to the negotiation of this
new agreement, daily absenteeism was over 20 percent and more than a thousand grievances
were pending; after the agreement, the same work force's absenteeism averaged about two
percent and grievances were minimal. See id. at 596-97.
89 Of course, the regime would not, and is not intended to, eliminate the posturing and
puffery typical of any negotiation.
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concession on a "permissive" topic. Thus, instead of promoting se-
crecy, the regime would promote clarity and sharing of information.
Both sides would have an incentive to delineate carefully a hierarchy
of demands so that bargaining on primary issues of dispute could
commence rapidly. If an impasse in negotiations did occur, both sides
would have an accurate picture of the other's position and could
thereby make informed use of their economic weapons. Thus the
regime might diminish the number of fruitless strikes. 90
As suggested above, these two positive effects of an overall good
faith bargaining requirement would also result from a requirement to
bargain on each subject advanced by a negotiating party. However,
the global good faith requirement is superior for two reasons. First,
its application in the unilateral change context is less costly. Under
the proposed global good faith bargaining regime, both sides satisfy
their duty to bargain by executing an initial agreement in good faith. 91
They are then free, subject to their contractual obligations under the
collective agreement, to take unilateral action during the term of the
agreement.92 Although the cost of negotiating the initial agreement
may increase - because both parties will want to negotiate for future
contingencies as well as present needs - significant savings would
result. Not only would it save time and money not to require bar-
gaining over a unilateral change whenever requested, 93 but there
would also be efficiency gains from allowing employers to take quick,
decisive unilateral action when expedient.
90 See supra note 70 (discussing potential for inefficient use of the strike weapon under the
current regime). Critics of the proposal might argue that it would increase industrial strife if
parties could insist to impasse on any issue. However, providing more subjects about which
employers and unions may bargain, will, in some instances, create wider opportunity for
compromise. See Cox & Dunlop, supra note 8o, at 427. Furthermore, if employers and unions
do not highly value bargaining over "permissive" subjects, then the elimination of the mandatory/
permissive distinction will not significantly widen the scope of bargaining. When it does,
however, the law should not prevent the party committed to a subject from pressing for its
inclusion in a collective bargaining agreement.
91 The duty to bargain in a posture of overall good faith should not preclude a union from
using unilateral change as a method of exerting economic pressure on the employer during
bargaining. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (i96o) (discussed at note
33 above). Such unilateral action would simply be another factor in the overall good faith
analysis. Likewise, the employer could institute a pre-impasse lockout. See supra note 33.
92 But cf. Plant Closing Law, supra note 71, § 3(a), at 891-92 (requiring 6o days notice of
plant closings and mass lay-offs).
Courts have promulgated different interpretations of whether bargaining is required during
the term of an existing agreement. Compare Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d
746, 751 (6th Cir. 1963) (concluding that if a subject is discussed and rejected during bargaining
of an initial agreement, later bargaining on that subject is foreclosed), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
971 (1964) with NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 196 F.2d 68o, 684 (2d Cir. 1952) (holding that an
employer must bargain about "subjects which were neither discussed nor embodied in any of
the terms and conditions of the contract").
93 Of course, a party could agree to bargain about the change.
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
Despite the cost savings, however, critics might contend that eco-
nomic efficiency should not outweigh the employees' need to bargain
over major unilateral decisions such as plant relocations or closings,
and that, therefore, a good faith discussion requirement should attach
to every subject. Such a requirement, however, would diminish bar-
gaining autonomy and undermine the integrity of the initial bargaining
agreement. The negotiation of that initial agreement - where the
parties were not precluded from bargaining about any subject -
constitutes consent to unilateral action on subjects not addressed
therein. Because each party is free to negotiate for control over any
subject, its failure to preserve the right to bargain over future contin-
gencies fairly implies consent. 94 Thus, the parties should not be re-
quired to bargain over midterm decisions unless negotiated otherwise
in the initial collective bargaining agreement.
Finally, and more importantly, the good faith proposal is superior
because it more closely comports with principles of free contract and
the theory behind the NLRA. Unlike the other proposals that require
bargaining on specific subjects, each side maintains its autonomy to
discuss or not to discuss and to agree or not to agree on any issue.
A party that finds discussion or concession on a bargaining topic
particularly important will concede on other topics or institute a work
stoppage to realize its demands. In essence, the proposal requires the
government to remain outside the office door.
V. CONCLUSION
Labor reform eliminating the mandatory/permissive distinction is
necessary. Returning to the underlying premises of the NLRA, that
reform should consist of a single, global duty to bargain in good faith.
Such a rule provides the solution to the current dispute over the
categorization of major operational decisions by allowing unions and
employers to decide for themselves whether bargaining over such
decisions is essential. More generally, it would increase bargaining
creativity and decrease the subterfuge common in current bargaining
practice. Most importantly, it would comport with the spirit of the
NLRA and allow free collective bargaining, and thereby increase the
autonomy of both employers and unions.
94 Unions may be reluctant to bargain over future contingencies because to do so would
require giving up present benefits. However, the reverse may be true for employers. In either
event, the parties, and not the courts or Congress, should make that decision.
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